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Modelling Terrorism and Political Violence
Andreas Armborst
Abstract
This article introduces some conceptual thoughts to the study of terrorism and provides 
answers to questions such as: can terrorism be studied like other crime phenomena? 
What are the conceptual and methodological challenges when framing terrorism as crime 
or military conflict? What are the epistemological consequences of studying a highly 
politicized object? What makes terrorist violence different from other forms of political 
violence such as guerrilla warfare and insurgency? For this purpose, in the first part of the 
article a review will be conducted to ascertain what criminologists have contributed to the 
conception of terrorism. In the second part a model of terrorism is elaborated that depicts 
the crucial parameters of this form of political violence and thereby bypasses some of the 
existing conceptual difficulties and misconceptions. We learn from the various definitions of 
terrorism that the singularity of terrorism has something to do with the victim, the purpose 
and the consequences of violence. Specifically the fact that terrorists are as indifferent to 
the various targets as they are to the various political consequences of their attack is what 
distinguishes terrorism from related phenomena of political violence. 
Keywords: armed conflict, civil war, definition of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, 
low-intensity warfare, modern warfare, political violence, terrorist violence
Introduction1
Researching a social phenomenon that is considered a menace to society creates 
a political climate within the research context where political requirements can 
interfere with scientific objectives. The discipline of criminology traditionally has to 
find the right balance between the two. This experience might be particular helpful 
for studying terrorism – the embodiment of the social threat. Many criminologists 
have also been accused of apologizing for the unjustifiable, when they approach a 
unanimously condemned crime such as paedophilia, drug-trafficking or terrorism 
with a value-free approach instead of a problem-solving approach. Specifically the 
study of terrorism must disengage from a politicized and deadlocked view on the 
topic, which does not hide the fact that an analytical precise definition of the term 
terrorism may have no applicability for the prevention of terrorism. Such a definition 
is developed throughout this article by drawing on crucial conceptual contributions 
from criminology and terrorism studies.
One reason that accounts for the problems of defining terrorism is the constant 
attempt to see it as a mutually exclusive category of political violence. Apparently it is 
difficult to draw a line of distinction because definitions of terrorism usually – either 
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implicitly or explicitly – refer to the concepts of innocence and conflict involvement 
of the victim, e.g. by using the term civilian. Just as there are different degrees 
of innocence and conflict involvement, violence against innocent and uninvolved 
people is terrorism to a different degree. This is not to deny that such attacks are tragic 
to different degrees – they are tragic in any case – but for the purpose of an analytical 
definition moral assessments are obstructive. The innocence of the victims usually 
is contested because perpetrators, victims and third parties hold different views of 
how deeply they are involved in the conflict and to what degree they are responsible 
for the problem that motivates the terrorists. One man’s innocent is another man’s 
collaborator. Because innocence and responsibility are disputed, the concept of 
substitutability of the terrorist target (and purpose) might be the more objective 
definitional parameter for terrorist violence. Both parameters, victim and purpose 
substitutability, can therefore be used as adequate indicators to assess the degree of 
terrorism of any given act of political violence. Deliberate physical violence against 
humans is terroristic to the degree to which different victims as well as different 
anticipated political consequences of the violent act are substitutes. The term 
substitute is borrowed from economics and indicates two or more choices of goods 
that all equally satisfy the consumer’s preferences.
The first part of this article shows conceptual differences between terrorism and 
more usual forms of delinquency as they are discussed in the criminological literature. 
These differences are summarised here as the three anomalies of terrorism. The 
article proceeds by pointing to an important similarity between studying crime and 
studying terrorism: the question of impartiality in the study of condemned behaviour. 
The last two sections then go on to depict two very different social facts that both fit 
the term terrorism. One is the discretionary/political usage of the term; the other is a 
particular type of political violence. This last part positions the category of terrorism 
on the continuum of political violence.
Three anomalies of terrorism
The discipline of criminology investigates social processes of ‘law (rule) making, law 
breaking, and reactions to law breaking’.2 Until the events of 9/11 criminologists were 
somewhat reluctant to study terrorism.3 Instead, this field was covered by political 
scientists and the terrorism studies community. Terrorism obviously involves acts 
of law-breaking and is prosecuted by law-enforcement institutions. It is thus rather 
surprising that the subject hardly found its way onto the criminology research agenda 
for a long time, while other unusual crime phenomena have been dealt with. This 
might be due to the fact that there are some conceptual difficulties that appear when 
one tries to frame terrorism as crime and delinquency. One problem is to determine 
what kind of criminal acts shall be considered terrorist crimes: only the violent act 
itself or the numerous ‘terrorist oriented crimes’4 that are necessary to prepare for the 
attack, such as money-laundering, document fraud or weapon procurement? What 
about preparatory acts that are not criminal, such as travelling or flight training? But 
even if researchers limit the subject-matter to the very act of performing violence, 
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conceptual difficulties still arise. Indeed we have to admit from a criminological point 
of view that terrorism is an unusual form of delinquency. The crucial conceptual 
differences between ordinary crime and terrorism that are discussed in the literature 
can be understood by thinking of three anomalies of terrorism.
1. Terrorist violence is moralistic violence
Unlike the perpetrator of stereotypical crimes such as theft, vandalism, drug offences 
or tax fraud, terrorists are convinced that they are restoring justice, rather than 
breaking the law. Terrorism, for the terrorists, is not perceived as a crime but as the 
reaction to a crime.5 However, this seems to be the case for some other crimes too. For 
Donald Black many incidents of violent crime are unilateral forms of self-help, either 
to retaliate, settle a dispute or compensate for a previous crime when penal measures 
are absent or considered insufficient. Such crimes therefore are conceptualized as 
‘social control’6 and consequently can be explained through theories of social control 
rather than theories of delinquency. Yet there are two attributes that distinguish 
vigilantism as social control from terrorism as social control. Vigilantism and penal 
measures defend the otherwise same norm, whereby criminal sanctions imposed by 
state authorities replace individual righteousness as a reaction to norm violations. For 
the purposes of terrorism there is often no legal option because the terrorist’s claims 
are usually at odds with conventional values. Criminal punishment is the (lawful) 
reaction to an unlawful act; vigilantism is the unlawful reaction to an unlawful act; and 
terrorism is the unlawful reaction to an act (or societal condition) whose lawfulness 
is contested and therefore cannot be addressed by law, which requires a high degree 
of social agreement. Donald Black’s theoretical explanation of terrorism is about 
this very point: certain societal constellations make it likely that collectives resort 
to terrorism to enforce their values. Black calls this constellation the ‘geometry of 
terrorism’ where adversaries are: 
physically close but socially distant ... The geometry of terrorism ... is not 
conducive to social control through law ... Thus, as a polarized structure of 
extremely distant adversaries attracts the quasi warfare of terrorism, so it attracts 
quasi-warfare against terrorism.7
It is important to understand that the political claims asserted through terrorism are 
not illegitimate per se. They are illegitimate from the point of view of the terrorist’s 
adversary of course; otherwise terrorism would not be necessary to assert these goals. 
But terrorism is not characterized by the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of the political 
claim but by the modus operandi of the activists. 
2. Terrorist violence is vicarious
The second difference between terrorism and vigilantism concerns the anonymous 
reciprocity of punishment and this is where the second anomaly comes into play. 
Unlike criminal punishment and vigilante justice, terrorist violence does not punish 
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the individual who is responsible for the perceived wrong. In fact it would be difficult 
to determine a responsible individual in the case of ‘offences’ such as capitalism, 
secularization or worldwide heresy. Rather, terrorism ‘applies a standard of collective 
liability’.8 The actual addressee of terrorist violence is the state power, the society 
or, more vaguely, the collective of ‘infidels’, ‘Zionists’, or ‘crusaders’ in the case of 
jihadi terrorism. And just as terrorism is addressed to collectives, it is also committed 
by collectives, whereby the individual bomb-carrier is an agent of an ideology or 
constituency. Most occurrences of interpersonal violence can be categorized as 
being either moralistic or coercive, which means that the victim has either somehow 
provoked the aggression or is simply an opportune target that can be coerced to 
satisfy some non-moralistic desire (e.g. monetary or sexual) of the offender. For 
terrorist violence this dichotomy does not apply: ‘As a form of violence, terrorism 
combines elements of predatory and moralistic violence ... Terrorism uses the means 
of predatory violence to accomplish the goal of moralistic violence.’9 Accordingly, 
the relation between the victim and the offender is vicarious on two accounts: the 
victim is held accountable for a grievance caused by collective action, and the offender 
retaliates an injustice on behalf of a diffuse constituency.
3. Terrorist violence is not controlled by conventional criminal justice measures
The third anomaly of terrorism is a consequence of its righteous nature and the 
political claims it shall promote. Terrorist violence is difficult to control even by 
the ultima ratio of state power: military violence and criminal investigation and 
punishment. This is because terrorism intentionally challenges the state’s monopoly 
of force. Terrorism seems to be the ultima ratio of resistance to state power. Heinrich 
Popitz’s10 paradox of power applies to the case of terrorism: the ultima ratio for 
the exercise of power – killing – is a resource that everyone can use. Specifically 
the power to kill is at the same time the prerequisite and the limitation of humans 
exercising power over humans.
Because terrorism is neither a genuine crime nor a form of genuine military 
aggression, the nation state employs a mix of measures for social control and conflict 
regulation in order to contain its occurrence: besides the ‘war model’, ‘the criminal 
justice model’ and the ‘expanded criminal justice model’,11 the ‘public health model’12 
and reconciliation and restorative justice13 have been introduced as a means of countering 
terrorism. Because this mix of measures seems to be insufficient, some states even 
make use of utilitarian instruments of power such as extraordinary renditions, targeted 
killings, or torture of terrorist suspects. Subtler changes in some domestic criminal 
justice systems have been described as demonstrating a ‘preventive turn’14 in penal 
policy. It seems that for offences related to terrorism the state favours the imperative 
to prevent such crimes over the constitutional or human rights of potential offenders.15
Some authors argue that these difficulties make research on terrorism incompatible 
with criminological paradigms and therefore terrorism should not be studied as an 
occurrence of delinquency.16 While it seems reasonable that criminological theory 
alone cannot sufficiently explain terrorist violence, it is not convincing to exclude 
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it from criminological research for this reason alone. Theoretical and conceptual 
difficulties only indicate the necessity for criminology to cope with reality. After 
all, it is the reality which sharpens theory and not vice versa: ‘If terrorism does 
not fit some theory, why blame terrorism, why not blame the theory.’17 Likewise, 
Sebastian Scheerer argues that the discipline must and can adapt to the ever-changing 
‘Sinnprovinz’18 of delinquency.
Challenges for impartial research on crime and terrorism
Besides conceptual anomalies, the study of terrorism and the study of crime also 
have some common ground. LaFree and Dugan have identified 10 similarities that 
are summarized in Table 1.19
From an epistemological point of view one important similarity is missing in this 
enumeration: for the study of terrorism as for the study of crime the researcher can 
choose whether he20 takes a preventative or an impartial approach to the object of study. 
This is a classic dilemma in criminological research because the general expectation 
of politicians, funding agencies and the general public is that criminological research 
Table 1 Similarities in the criminological study of terrorism versus common 
crime as discussed in Lafree and Dugan, ‘How Does Studying Terrorism Compare 
to Studying Crime?’
Comparing the study of terrorism with the study of crime: similarities
Conceptual Both terrorism and common crime:
•  are interdisciplinary
•  are both social constructs
•   are selectively prosecuted and thereby show the discrepancy 
between law in books and law in action
•  are disproportionately committed by young malesa
•  undermine social trust, when they appear on a sustain level 3
Methodological For the study of terrorism, as for the study of common crime, similar 
kinds of analysis are relevant:
•  patterns, distributions and trends
•  geographic mapping
•  time series analysis
•  causal analysis
•  life course analysis
Data collection For common crime, a wealth of different empirical data exists 
(official records, victimization and self-report surveys). For terrorism 
there are mainly ’terrorism event’ statistics (e.g. PGIS, ITERATE, 
RAND-MIPT,) and secondary data.
a Some of the differences which Lafree and Dugan (p. 56) label conceptual seem to be more empirical e.g. 
‘Terrorism, like common crime, is disproportionately committed by young males’.  
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should contribute to the solution of the crime problem. Although these expectations 
are admissible, the discipline is not predominantly responsible for the eradication 
of crime, but for providing a general picture about the causes and consequences of 
delinquency, and how human collectives deal with norm violations. According to 
these two sometimes competing expectations, criminological research can be divided 
into applied ‘administrative criminology’21 and fundamental research. For research 
in terrorism the same division has been acknowledged.22
The question about scientific impartiality deserves attention, because it has 
epistemological consequences. A highly politicized research topic such as terrorism 
tends to be approached with a high degree of political intent. Many researchers 
study the subject because the legislature or the executive is in need of a sound 
basis for counter-terrorism measures. This is reasonable, and certainly prevention 
studies are usually objective with regard to their respective research. But if the 
research community predominantly engages in the analysis of terrorism with the 
object of preventing it, then we will end up with a ‘skewed research agenda’.23 This 
is the case with ‘the discipline of terrorology’,24 the ‘terrorism industry’,25 and the 
‘propagandistic approach’ to the study of terrorism,26 a research field comparable to 
administrative criminology in which the research interest is stated by policy-makers 
who seek technical solutions for the prevention of crime and terrorism.27
In a classic article entitled ‘Whose Side Are We On?’ the criminologist Howard 
Becker claims that the study of deviance always includes a hierarchy of morals, and 
that ‘Many more studies are biased in the direction of the interests of responsible 
officials than the other way around.’28 If one applies this statement to the context 
of terrorism research, one could only disagree insofar as probably all studies on 
terrorism show this bias.29 According to Becker, one reason why this bias systemically 
occurs in the social sciences is that the moral hierarchy correlates with a ‘hierarchy 
of credibility’. The researcher is more likely accused of being prejudiced the more 
he articulates the position of the ‘underdog’ in a moral hierarchy (which might be 
under-researched and therefore is of particular scientific interest), while studies 
articulating the opinion of the establishment remain unquestioned. Arguing from the 
point of view of the establishment is more credible than arguing from the point of view 
of the underdog. Experimental evidence from research in social psychology shows 
that the process of explaining possible reasons for doing harm can indeed ‘produce 
a relatively condoning attitude toward perpetrators as a result of explaining their 
action’.30 Further, the authors found that the explaining/condoning effect is perceived 
to be stronger by third parties than it actually is.31 Irrespective of the actual attitude 
of the scientist researching evil, third parties who read (or listen to) the scientist’s 
explanation assume this condoning attitude.32
The hierarchy of credibility is presumably stronger or weaker depending on the 
type of crime under consideration and the degree of its controversy. For terrorism, 
this hierarchy is imperative: ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’, 
President George W. Bush emphasised in an address to a joint session of Congress 
and the American people in 2001.33 Apparently, for the research of terrorism the 
hierarchy of credibility is of high relevance:
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In too many minds the only acceptable response to terrorism is revulsion and 
condemnation. Those who appear to respond differently – such as arguing for 
a balanced understanding ... – can all too easily be labelled as sympathisers, 
apologists and appeasers.34 
The criminologist Niggli accepted this fact and advocates the exclusion of terrorist 
violence from the criminological research agenda because the researcher either 
has to be loyal to the state, or would have to take a critical approach towards 
power: ‘If one feels one cannot do so, then there is only the conclusion that the 
phenomenon of terrorism is not, and cannot be, a “proper” topic in the field of 
criminology.’35
This raises the question whether terrorism can be studied from the terrorists’ point 
of view at all without the researcher being considered a sympathizer and the results 
being ignored. The question ‘whose side are we on?’ can be a dilemma for the 
criminologist studying terrorism, especially when conducting field research.36 The 
dilemma occurs whether the position of the terrorists is considered and articulated 
(rather than advocated) or not. The domain of terrorism studies and criminology lack 
works that articulate the views of the moral underdog (which might indeed be due to 
the hierarchy of credibility and the subsequent accusation of bias against those who 
articulate unconventional views). 
So far we have looked at the world from the point of view of the civilian victims 
of terrorism, the security forces fighting terrorism, the millions of ordinary people 
who directly or indirectly witness terrorism, the politicians who legislate in order 
to try to control terrorism – from just about every angle, except the point of view 
of the terrorists.37
But even Moghaddam’s book From the Terrorists’ Point of View seemingly cannot 
escape the preventive imperative. ‘Seeing the world from the terrorist point of view 
does not mean condoning terrorism; rather, it means better understanding terrorism 
so as to end it.’38
Certainly counter-terrorism efforts should be evidence-based in order to 
facilitate their success, but political considerations can provide a weak basis for 
empirical research. For fundamental research there is always a chance of finding 
applicable results that alleviate problems or bring about progress, but there is 
no guarantee. Both approaches can provide objective, though different, results 
about the object under study as the following example of a physician and his 
patient shows:
The physician, after all, is not necessarily less objective because he has made 
a partisan commitment to his patient and against the germ. The physician’s 
objectivity is in some measure vouchsafed because he has committed himself to 
a specific value: health. It is this commitment that constrains him to see and say 
things about the patient’s condition that neither may want to know.39
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What are these things that the researcher does not see and say when employing 
a preventive approach to the study of terrorism?40 One thing seems to be a sound 
analytical definition of terrorism, which will be discussed in the following part of 
this article. To sum up: research of contentious objects allows the researcher to 
take a position somewhere on the moral axis of condoning–condemning, as well 
as somewhere on the intentional axis of preventing–observing. There seems to be a 
drive for researchers to take a condemnatory–preventive approach.
Terrorism and its two meanings
This part of the article reviews contributions that successfully bypassed some of the 
epistemological problems associated with the preventive approach. Single conceptual 
elements within those contributions are selected and compiled into a sound analytical 
description of terrorism.
There are two different, but equally valuable, descriptive understandings of 
terrorism. The word does not only refer to an empirical phenomenon that can be 
directly observed (like gravity, for instance). The term can also be considered 
exclusively as a discretionary label with political utility. Political actors use the term 
terrorism not for descriptive purposes but for political ones, e.g. resorting to certain 
legal actions in order to remedy terrorism. Accordingly terrorism has two distinct 
realties: first it is a removable label used for political purposes and second it is a certain 
modus operandi of political violence. This article is primarily about the description of 
terrorism as a modus operandi of political violence. Nevertheless it seems important 
to understand that the term refers to two very different social entities. Therefore the 
meaning of terrorism as a political label is briefly discussed here.
Terrorism as political discretion
One way to look at terrorism is to understand it exclusively and consistently as a 
polemic construct, as in the following definition: terrorism is a label attached to 
subversive political action that marks the enemy’s damnability (and thereby justify 
extraordinary measures to fight him).41 In this case, the empirical correlate of the 
term is a discursive construct, which reflects power interests. Because the monopoly 
of force is contested and challenged by terrorist activists, the political establishment 
uses its definitional power to label these claims and the violent methods to achieve 
them as illegitimate and evil. Lauderdale and Oliverio persuasively claim that, ‘there 
is no consistent unity in the way terrorism has been defined or constructed throughout 
the ages’.42 It appears that throughout all kinds of political conflicts, revolutionary 
activism has been declared terrorist in a seemingly arbitrary manner.
By understanding terrorism explicitly as a polemic construct, the researcher can 
identify and examine patterns in the seemingly random attribution of the term to 
different kinds of revolutionary and subversive activism. For this approach it has 
to be accepted that the political practice of labelling actors as terrorists cannot be 
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evaluated as true or false but rather must be considered a performative utterance.43 
The researcher who chooses the labelling approach44 to the study of terrorism asks 
questions such as: what kinds of social phenomena have been labelled terrorist, by 
whom and why, and with what consequences? Abstractly speaking, the researcher 
looks for the empirical correlate of a semantic construct (terrorism). This is somewhat 
unusual for social scientists (while not so for linguists or philosophers) because 
usually they observe a real-world phenomenon and then, ex post, try to define and 
typologize it through scientific language. In this case it is the usage of the term that 
decides which action is de facto terrorism and which is not. Apparently this is a field 
of research rarely found within prevention studies.
Terrorism as political violence
According to the second understanding of terrorism, the empirical correlate of the 
term is a certain modus operandi of political violence and social activism. The 
majority of the literature on the topic deals with this aspect of terrorism and the key 
question: which kind of political violence is terrorist and which is not?
The literature points to the importance of not confusing terrorism with the nature 
of the political claim a terrorist group might express. Terrorism is a method, a modus 
operandi, and not an ideology or worldview.45 Terrorism pursues no goal; jihadists, 
nationalists, separatists, millenary sects, or right-wing activists employ terrorism as 
a means of enforcing their very different goals and worldviews. Louise Richardson 
clarifies this widespread misconception by stating:
This same confusion between ends and means is what has given the rather silly 
adage that ‘one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist’ such a long life. 
The adage just reinforces the point that we don’t like to label people whose goals 
we share as terrorists.46
A freedom fighter can still be a terrorist for the very same person. Terrorism is not 
primarily characterized by the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the political goals, but by 
the modus operandi in reaching those goals. This analytical assertion is not to deny that 
terrorist means are often employed by those who express claims conventionally perceived 
as illegitimate, but to point to the differences between political claim and political method.
The understanding of terrorism as a method makes the search for generalizing root 
causes questionable. Richardson explains the banality of terrorism: ‘If there is one 
single explanation it is that terrorism is a tactic and people use it because they think 
that, at some level, it works.’47 Terrorism seems to be too diverse a phenomenon for 
identifying single factors (such as poverty, failed states or social tensions) that have 
high explanatory power. It seems meaningful, however, to look for the root causes for 
specific conflicts in which terrorism occurs. At this level it is possible to study why 
certain groups think a terrorist tactic might be legitimate, necessary and successful for 
reaching their goal. On this basis general causes of terrorism can be looked for, but it 
may be that so-called terrorists have very little in common to explain their behaviour.
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What kind of human violence constitutes terrorist violence? Two well-known 
studies have systematized parts of the vast body of literature containing definitions 
on terrorism, and thereby identified single ‘definitional elements’: Schmidt and 
Jongman have conducted a survey among experts in the terrorism studies community 
asking for their definition of terrorism.48 Across 109 definitions the authors identified 
22 definitional elements such as ‘threat’, ‘psychological impact’, ‘publicity’, 
‘randomness’, ‘civilian victims’ and so on. In a follow-up study, Weinberg and 
colleagues compared these 22 definitional elements in a meta-analysis of 55 articles in 
academic journals containing definitions of terrorism to find a consensual definition. 
The authors conclude that the consensual definition49 (containing those elements that 
at least 20 per cent of the authors use) is ‘highly general’.50 Likewise Silke notes: 
‘The various definitions reach from the absurdly overspecialized to the unacceptably 
over-general.’51 Since the consensual definition seems to be of little analytical use, 
it is reasonable to identify those definitional parameters that are crucial for gaining 
conceptual clarification. Particularly helpful in this regard are Richardson’s ‘seven 
crucial characteristics of the term terrorism’52 which state that terrorism is (1) politically 
inspired (2) violence53 committed by (3) sub-state actors that seek to (4) communicate 
a message by selecting (5) symbolic and (6) civilian targets that are in principle 
(7) interchangeable. This definition acknowledges important characteristics of terrorism 
but is still problematic for two related reasons: first, it treats terrorism as a mutually 
exclusive category within the spectrum of political violence, where this exclusiveness 
can be questioned, and second, it uses an ambiguous definitional parameter: civilians.
Implicit in the definitional parameter ‘civilians’ are associations such as 
‘uninvolved’, ‘innocent’ or ‘neutral’, all of which suggest civilian targets to be 
illegitimate targets. Accordingly, the definition remains controversial because one 
man’s civilian is another man’s combatant (or at least a supporter of the enemy). 
From an ethical point of view this distinction is not always as easy as one might 
suppose, especially in high-conflict environments. Quasi-military actors such as 
private contractors who are involved in combat cannot easily be regarded as civilians, 
although technically they might be. Non-combatant civilians who support or represent 
the enemy may be considered a legitimate target, not only for the perpetrators. So 
another simplistic answer to the fundamental question ‘Why do people deliberately 
and violently attack innocent civilians?’ might be ‘Because the perpetrators don’t 
think their victims are innocent civilians.’
Moreover, the distinction of a target as either civilian or military does not 
sufficiently discriminate terrorism from guerrilla tactics.54 If we simply consider 
‘civilians’ in the sense of international humanitarian law as anyone who is not 
wearing a military uniform, we cannot distinguish terrorism from insurgency or 
guerrilla tactics. In most asymmetric conflicts, non-military targets (such as police 
forces, judges, people engaged in transport, diplomats and other ‘collaborators’) are 
attacked.55 ‘Deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes’56 is 
not necessarily terrorism in a strict analytical sense. Guerrilla and terrorist tactics 
are similar in many ways and can only be distinguished gradually. In the reality of a 
conflict, they both appear side by side and their analytical distinction has no practical 
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value. The Taliban, for instance, when planning a military operation, presumably do 
not discuss in depth the question whether the operation should be an insurgent or 
terrorist attack. Nor are their victims concerned with this academic question.
It depends on additional criteria to decide whether an attack on civilians is 
considered a guerrilla or a terrorist attack. For most occurrences of political violence 
such as insurgency or guerrilla warfare, the target has some attributes that interfere 
with the interests and intentions of the group, and is killed exactly for this reason. The 
goals of a guerrilla attack cannot be reached by killing anyone else. An illustrative 
example is that of political assassination. The assassin and the constituency on whose 
behalf he acts anticipate an immediate political impact from the ad hoc killing. For 
terrorism there is no immediate utility that results from the target’s death and the 
anticipated effect of the attack is usually much vaguer.
It appears that terrorists rarely have a very coherent idea of what kind of reaction 
they will get ... Terrorists appear more interested in the scale of the reaction than 
[in] the details. They can countenance opposite reactions, from capitulation to 
widespread repression, and be almost equally pleased.57
This is Richardson’s crucial observation. Because almost any consequence of the 
attack is welcomed it does not matter who is killed as long as the attack is massive 
and symbolic. Just as the purposes of terrorism are substitutable so are the victims. 
According to the rationale of terrorist groups every change from the political status 
quo is necessarily an improvement. The terrorist experiment seems to be about the 
grim curiosity ‘let’s see what happens if …’58
The continuum of political violence59
What we learn from the various definitions of terrorism is that the singularity of 
terrorism has something to do with the victim, the purpose and the consequences of 
violence. Specifically, the fact that terrorists are as indifferent to the various targets 
as they are to the various political consequences of their attack is what distinguishes 
terrorism (even though only slightly) from related phenomena of political violence. 
Therefore it seems reasonable to regard the substitutability between different victims and 
different potential consequences as a decisive element of terrorist violence: deliberate 
physical violence against humans is terroristic to the degree to which different victims 
as well as different anticipated political consequences of the violent act are substitutes.
The term substitute is borrowed from economics and indicates two or more choices 
of goods that equally satisfy the consumer’s preferences. This analogy appears to be 
cynical but unfortunately this is the logic of terrorism. The terrorists are as indifferent 
to the various targets as they are to the political consequences of their attack. One 
can introduce into the violence criteria further add-ons such as ‘the serious attempt’, 
‘the threat’ or ‘committed by sub-state actors’ if these are considered helpful, but the 
decisive parameter is the degree to which potential victims and potential consequences 
are interchangeable so as to satisfy the attackers’ preferences.
 at Max Planck Society on December 15, 2010ire.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
	 MODELLING TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE	 425
The concept of substitutability helps to discern different degrees of political 
violence; at one end of the continuum we find terrorism (for which the victim is 
perfectly substitutable) and at the other ad hoc military violence (for which the target 
is perfectly limited) (see Table 2). If the age, sex, religion, nationality, worldview or 
political function of the victim do not matter to the perpetrators, and neither does it 
matter what the potential political consequences of the attacks are as long as they are 
significant, then this is indeed the ideal type of terrorist attack. In less obvious cases 
it still may be justifiable to classify an incident as terrorist; as already mentioned, 
the different types of political violence are not mutually exclusive to each other. At 
the other end of the continuum we find ad hoc military operations for which the 
target is perfectly limited such as the targeted killing of a key organizational leader 
or assassinations of key political or military figures.
The four graphs in Figure 1 show the gradual transition from ad hoc military 
violence to optimal terrorist violence. The line indicates the degree of preference 
for various targets. For ad hoc military violence (1) operations are restricted to a 
clearly defined target (e.g. key personnel); for military-related violence (2) there is 
a wider cluster of preferable targets but there still is a clear-cut distinction between 
preferable and unfavourable targets, as can be seen by the steep increase and decrease 
of the curve. For proximate terrorist violence (3), such as insurgency and guerrilla 
warfare, the range of preferable targets and the target/non-target dichotomy begins to 
Table 2 Continuum and characteristics of political violence
Continuum of political violence:
(4) Optimal 
terrorist violence
(3) Proximate 
terrorist violence
(2) Military-
related violence
(1) Dedicated 
political and 
military violence
Degree 
of victim 
substitutability
Perfectly 
substitutable
e.g. regarding 
nationality, 
political 
function, religion
Partially 
substitutable 
e.g. within certain 
social groups 
(religious groups, 
state officials, 
occupying forces) 
Partially 
limited
Small target 
groups 
determined by 
purpose
Perfectly limited
Purposes 
determine the 
target
Degree of 
purpose 
substitutability
Perfectly 
substitutable
Indifferent to 
various political 
consequences
Partially 
substitutable
Vague objectives 
e.g. retaliation, 
demoralizing 
the enemy, 
mobilizing 
supporters and 
sympathizers
Partially 
limited
Territorial 
control, 
decimation,
military 
defeat, general 
deterrence 
Perfectly limited
Dedicated 
objectives 
e.g. ad hoc 
targeted killings, 
assassinations, 
incapacitation 
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blur (smooth curve). As this trend continues we approach optimal terrorist violence 
(4) for which various targets are nearly perfectly substitutable.
It has been noted that unclear, undefined, or heterogeneous enemy hierarchies 
are “most often a sign of increasing radicalization and political isolation”61. While 
some isolated, radical groups abstain from political violence it seems that moral and 
operational isolation is a necessary condition for groups to consider a wide spectrum 
of potential military and non-military targets as equally preferable. And, as argued 
in this article, the more activists lose sight of what they actually want to achieve 
(that is, the more they are indifferent to the political consequences of an attack) the 
closer they come to what has been defined here as terrorism.
Although it is not possible to measure the degree of victim and purpose 
substitutability, it should at least be possible to rank both parameters on an ordinal 
level (that is, in terms of ‘more’ or ‘less’). When assessing two or more incidents 
of political violence it should be possible to locate them at certain sectors on the 
scale in Table 2. The more context information is available, e.g. about the identity 
of the victims, modus operandi of the attack, claims of responsibility, etc., the better 
an attack can be classified. Nevertheless, the conceptual clarity of the assessment 
is subjective to the degree to which one has to speculate about the anticipated 
consequences of the plotters.
Figure 1 Transitions between four types of political violence60
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Making the degree of victim and purpose substitutability the two defining 
parameters for terrorism allows us to consider military targets as targets of terrorism. 
If the target is nearly perfectly substitutable – that is, the purpose of the attack could 
expect to be reached through killing anyone else – then even a military target can 
be a terrorist target. Admittedly, military targets are seldom perfectly substitutable; 
at the very least they are attacked because a nation is involved in some conflict, but 
from a strategic point of view it makes a difference whether a bridgehead or military 
personnel in a non-conflict environment is attacked. According to the definition 
stated above, the 2008 Mumbai attacks are more terroristic than the foiled attacks 
of the German Sauerland cell against the US base in Ramstein.62 And the latter, in 
turn, can be considered more terroristic than an attack against military transports 
in Afghanistan. To cite another example, two hostage situations are more or less 
terroristic to the degree to which there are concrete (and realistic) demands, and to 
the degree to which the threat to hurt or kill the hostage is appropriately timed to 
influence somebody who is actually able to fulfil these demands. Demanding the 
withdrawal of US troops from the Middle East with a tourist held hostage appears 
to be more terroristic than demanding the release of certain prisoners using a high-
ranking diplomatic hostage. As stated in the introduction, less terroristic does not 
mean less tragic.
Not only can single incidents of political violence be located on the continuum, 
but groups engaging in political violence can be rated according to their usual method 
of engagement. Using the proposed model for such an assessment, the Red Army 
Fraction (engaged most often in assassinations and kidnappings) would be rated as 
being less terroristic than al-Qaeda in Iraq (whose activists have a much broader 
target spectrum).
In principle, the model would allow for overly repressive and criminal violence 
by the state to be considered as terrorism. However, cases of state terrorism where 
the victims are perfectly interchangeable and the anticipated consequences are 
extremely vague may simply not occur. Repressive terror by the state usually 
appears to be much more purposeful than revolutionary terrorism. Moreover, 
regime-preserving violence is necessarily limited to potential subversives (who 
usually share a common citizenship). Likewise, when a state is at war with another 
state it directs its military violence against a limited set of targets. In any case state 
violence is directed against a more or less well-defined group and therefore cannot 
be considered terroristic within the scope of this model. Again, labelling inhumane 
state conduct as non-terroristic is not to deny the tragedy that various despotic 
regimes have caused in history. Sociologically it is just something different.
As well as the victim of the attack, it might be important to consider the 
environment and context in which the attack takes place. Whereas for terrorism the 
victim and the consequences are interchangeable, the place, the setting and the time 
are not. The ‘success’ of terrorism, if it comes to provoking a reaction, is a function 
of the number of victims and the place and modality of their death. Large numbers 
guarantee attention and reaction, but so do famous locations and unusually brutal 
modus operandi.
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Summary
Terrorism shows three anomalies when compared with more common forms of 
crime and delinquency: first, terrorist violence is the reaction to a perceived injustice 
(at least this is claimed by the activists) facilitated through the ‘moral outrage’63 of 
individuals. Second, unlike usual forms of retaliative violence and vigilantism, terrorist 
violence targets individuals as substitutes for those who are directly responsible for the 
perceived wrong. Likewise, the perpetrator of a terrorist act might not have personally 
experienced any injustice, but acts on behalf of some constituency whose norms and 
morals have been violated. Accordingly, terrorist violence can occur in the paradoxical 
situation of someone whose norms and morals have not been directly violated killing 
an individual who has not violated anyone’s norms and morals. Such a victim–offender 
configuration is difficult to find for other crimes. And, third, because terrorism is neither 
genuine crime nor genuine military aggression it appears as though the containment 
of terrorism does not follow the principles, paradigms and doctrines of conventional 
crime control and military intervention, but rather is addressed through a mix of both, 
as well as through means of negotiation and conciliation.
Just as terrorist violence defies control through classic intervention practices, 
terrorist violence defies description and explanation through classic theories of 
delinquency. It seems to be indispensible to incorporate theories into terrorism 
studies that explain how human collectives assert their values and respond to what 
they perceive as injustice. Still, the study of crime and the study of terrorism share 
some conceptual and methodological similarities, such as the researcher’s dilemma of 
having to choose between a preventive and a critical/impartial approach to the object 
of study. Because the researcher is usually part of the establishment that is threatened 
by terrorism and crime, there is the general expectation of politicians, funding 
agencies and the general public that he contributes to the solution of the problem. 
Although evidence-based counter-terrorism is an important element of contemporary 
security policy (foreign and domestic), research should not be limited to preventive 
studies. Research free of political necessities is likely to produce results that enhance 
our understanding of why groups consider terrorist means to be legitimate, necessary 
and functional. There is a chance, but no guarantee, that such fundamental research 
will provide important insights into preventing terrorism.
Studying terrorism can mean two different things: first it can be about the question 
‘What different kinds of social phenomena have been labelled terrorist, by whom and 
why, and with what consequences?’ and, second, it can enquire into the causes and 
consequences of terrorism as a modus operandi of political violence. Two crucial 
features characterize this particular kind of violence: terrorists are indifferent to their 
various targets and they are indifferent to the various political consequences of their 
attack. Terrorist activism, more than being precisely calculated action, is characterized 
by the drive ‘to do something’, and it has to be drastic. Various political, social and 
strategic consequences are equally preferred by the terrorists; this might be one reason 
why terrorism is sometimes considered to be ‘not based on the logic of consequence 
and is thus irrational according to the [strategic] model’.64
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Indeed it seems to be necessary to identify the political preferences as officially 
claimed by the terrorists with unstated preferences on the social and psychological 
level that all account for the diversification of ‘enemy hierarchies’.65 Future research on 
terrorism has to identify subjective causes: that is, motivations for terrorist violence from 
the terrorists’ point of view. Objective, measurable factors (e.g. poverty rates, corruption, 
repression, occupation, social alienation, moral disparities) do not deterministically lead 
to political violence, but are cognitively processed by social actors who may or may 
not find violent activism an appropriate reaction to the grievance.
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